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ABSTRACT: Organizations today invest in collaborative IT to engage in 
collaborative alliances to sustain or improve their competitive positions. Effective use 
of this collaborative IT in an alliance requires a deeper understanding of their 
governance structures. This effort is to ensure the sustainability of these alliances. 
Through the relational view of the firm, we suggest relational lateral IT-steering 
committees, relational IT operational committees, and relational IT performance 
management systems as IT governance structures for collaborative alliances. We then 
incorporate these structures, develop a model for approaches to governing 
collaborative IT, and evaluate the effectiveness for such governance structures in the 
IT-dependent alliances. We suggest that IT governance efforts of an alliance should 
contribute to their collaborative rent. We also suggest that the collaborative rent of an 
alliance would relate to the business value of its alliance partners. Field survey data 
containing 192 responses indicates a positive influence of the suggested IT 
governance efforts of the alliance on the collaborative rent of the alliance. The results 
also suggest a positive impact of the collaborative rent of the alliance on the business 
value of the alliance partners.    
Keywords: collaborative organizational structures, IT governance structures, 
collaborative rent, relational view of the firm, business value 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper adopts the relational view of the firm (Dyer and Singh 1998) to suggest 
governance structures for collaborative information technology (IT) resources. Collaborative 
IT consists of IT investments by organizations to engage in strategic alliances. A strategic 
alliance is a relationship between two or more parties (alliance partners) to pursue a set of 
agreed upon goals while remaining independent organizations (Weber and Chathoth 2008). 
This study is important because practices required to govern collaborative IT differ from the 
practices of governing IT used in a single organization. This study also includes assessment 
of the effectiveness of the IT governance structures of an alliance. Effectiveness relates to 
how IT governance structures influence attainment of value in an organizational setting. In a 
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strategic alliance, effectiveness means adding value to alliance partners. The term structure 
relates to configuration of organizational resources to govern IT. For example, an IT 
governance structure, the IT steering committee (Wilkin and Chenhall 2010; Karimi et al. 
2000; Prasad, Heales, and Green 2010), is a configuration of various levels of management to 
govern the IT resources.    
There has been significant growth in alliance activity in recent times (Ziggers and 
Tjemkes 2010; Arino and Torre 1998; Zarvić et al. 2012). Organizations are now making 
substantial changes to their IT resources to strengthen their alliance structures and to establish 
collaborative relationships (Caglio and Ditillo 2009). This situation is because most 
organizations’ final products or services are outcomes of activities of wider inter-organization 
value chains (Iyer, Aubeterre, and Singh 2008). Most of these business activities now depend 
on IT-intensive information systems (IS). Competitive forces have led organizations to invest 
in IT that improves activities of the value chains that may fall outside of organizations direct 
control (Ziggers and Tjemkes 2010). That is, organizations are continually perusing ways to 
integrate their information systems to facilitate co-creation, co-development, and co-
innovation (de Rond 2003; Rai et al. 2012; Grover and Kohli 2012; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012). 
This situation means that doing business today is about bringing disparate collaborative 
resources together to achieve competitive advantage and business sustainability. This radical 
investment and redeployment of IT resources has transformed alliances into collaborative 
organizational structures (COS). COS are inter-organizational alliances that are developed 
with investment by alliance partners in collaborative IT to manage value chains of the 
alliance. Collaboration is the process in which entities share information, resources and 
responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a program of activities to achieve a 
common goal and, therefore, jointly generate value. For example, click and mortar (or virtual 
e-commerce) organizations integrate their information systems to form alliances with logistic 
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companies and finance-related organizations for order fulfillment and logistics purposes. 
Today’s rich Web 2.0 tools (McAfee 2009; Kane and Fichman 2009) complement this 
information system integration, and provide a platform of social interaction to the alliance 
partners.  
Organizations invest in collaborative IT because they anticipate superior value from 
collaborative use of IT resources. However, even in a collaborative setting, IT resources, per 
se, will not be a source of sustained value (Powell and Dent-Micallef 1997). Rather, superior 
value from this collaborative IT will be contingent upon its governance in COS. Broadly, IT 
governance is a conceptualization of steering the use of IT within an organizational setting. 
The common understating of IT governance is that it is about controlling the strategic impact 
of IT and its value delivery to the business (Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops 
2004; Luftman and McLean 2004; Weill and Ross 2004; Bart and Turel 2010). Governance 
of collaborative IT in COS is also about controlling the strategic impact of IT and its value 
delivery to alliance partners through the alliance. Extant research has suggested a number of 
intra-organizational IT governance structures to control and manage IT resources (see for 
example, Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Prasad, Heales, and Green 2010; Weill and Ross 
2004; Bowen, Chung, and Rohde 2007). Wilkin and Chenhall (2010) provide a thorough 
review of intra-organizational IT governance practices. However, leverage of collaborative IT 
in COS to attain strategic objectives requires a different set of IT governance structures. 
Importantly, IT governance structures for collaborative IT do not originate in COS. Rather, 
every collaborative alliance partner must bring some IT governance competency to the 
alliance structure. This requirement means the nature of governance structures of 
collaborative IT in COS is different, and it requires attention.         
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 We address the following key questions relating to the governance of collaborative 
IT in COS in this study: What should the nature of IT governance structures for COS be? 
How can an alliance partner evaluate the effectiveness of its IT governance efforts in a 
collaborative setting? Consistent with the relational view of the firm, we suggest that 
organizations’ critical IT governance capabilities will have to extend beyond firm boundaries. 
That is, alliance partners of a COS will need to understand the synergy between their existing 
intra-firm IT governance competencies to develop inter-firm IT governance competencies. 
This situation means one aspect of IT governance structures for COS will be a product of the 
synergy between the IT governance competencies of the alliance partners. Alliances must 
also continuously evaluate effectiveness of their IT governance efforts. This exercise will 
determine the important fit between the IT governance structures and the nature of decisions 
required to leverage the value of collaborative IT. Theory suggests that IT governance efforts 
of COS should first contribute to the collaborative rent of the COS.  We further suggest that 
collaborative rent of an alliance would contribute to business value of partners of that 
alliance. We define collaborative rent as superior value generated through the collaborative 
relationship not generated alone by the collaborative alliance partner. Collaborative rent 
requires fusion of idiosyncratic resources of the alliance partners.  Business value consists of 
aspects that determine the health and well-being of organizations at both the business process 
and the firm level. Figure 1 below conceptualizes our approach. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Consistent with our theoretical framework we suggest lateral relational IT steering 
committee (RSC), relational IT operational systems committee (ROC), and relational IT 
performance management system (RPM) as IT governance structures for COS.  Field survey 
data containing 192 responses validated our suggested model. The results indicate that the 
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suggested IT governance structures for COS have a positive influence on the collaborative 
rent of the COS. Our findings also show a positive influence of collaborative rent of the COS 
that a partner was part of on business value of the partner. Overall, the model infers that 
governance of collaborative IT with the suggested IT governance structures by COS leads to 
better business value for the alliance partners. The rest of this paper progresses as follows. 
The next section presents an overview on IT governance and COS. This section is followed 
by a discussion of the theoretical framework of this study and hypotheses development. A 
discussion of the research design then follows. We then present the results of this study. The 
final sections discuss the results, contributions, and implications of this study to theory and 
practice. 
II. IT GOVERNANCE AND COLLABORATIVE STRUCTURES – AN 
OVERVIEW 
A primary role of an organization is to meet the expectations of its key stakeholders. 
Expectations are met by demonstrating effectiveness and efficiency in managing business 
processes that consume stakeholder resources and meet set objectives. Today, IT-intensive 
information systems manage these business processes. This situation means that having in 
place mechanisms to govern these IT resources is an important activity in organizations. 
Thus, IT governance relates to steering the use of IT in an organizational setting. The 
conceptualization of IT governance has changed over the years. Initially the focus of IT 
governance was on supervision, monitoring, and control of organizations (Wilkin and 
Chenhall 2010; Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops 2004). Recent conceptualization 
of IT governance relates to the concept of strategic alignment and value delivery (IT 
Governance Institute 2007; Van Grembergen and De Haes 2009; Zarvić et al. 2012; Huang, 
Zmud, and Price 2010; Xue, Liang, and Boulton 2008). That is, today, decisions on IT should 
align with the strategic goals of an organization. However, achieving the set strategies 
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requires adherence to set rules and managing continuity of existing processes. Consistent 
with these intermingled organizational objectives, Wilkin and Chenhall (2010) provide a 
detailed review of organizations’ needs to govern their IT resources. These motives include 
achieving strategic alignment, risk management, resource management, value delivery, and 
performance management (Wilkin and Chenhall 2010). These motives present varying, yet 
related definitions of IT governance. For example Weill and Ross (2004) define IT 
governance as specifying the decision rights and accountability framework to encourage 
desirable behaviour in the use of IT resources. The IT Governance Institute (2007) suggests 
that the decisions relating to IT resources (IT governance) should sustain and extend the 
organization's strategies and objectives.  
Many of these governance needs are related. For example, the governance need - 
ensuring strategic alignment - enhances business value of organizations. Moreover, the 
governance need - understanding and managing business risks - gives assurance that 
organizations would be able to meet their strategic objectives and obtain competitive value. 
However, organizations’ focus in participating in alternative structures like COS is primarily 
towards achieving strategic goals (Grover and Kohli 2012; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Sarker et 
al. 2012). This situation suggests that an organization’s decision to participate in COS is a 
way of achieving its set strategic goals by utilizing its resources in a different setting. 
Achieving set strategic goals would ensure delivery of anticipated value to organizations. We 
focus on this motivation of IT governance in this study. Thus, we define IT governance as the 
set of structures and procedures of IT-related decision making to ensure that an organization 
achieves its strategic objectives in a collaborative setting. 
Several of supporting mechanisms can guide alliances in the implementation of their 
IT governance structures. The relevance of these supporting mechanisms is contingent upon 
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the core objectives of IT governance. The Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT) framework provides good practices for governing IT1. COBIT provides 
tools to assess and measure the performance of 34 IT processes of an organization (IT 
Governance Institute 2007). The ISO/IEC 38500:2008, corporate governance of information 
technology, provides a framework for effective governance of IT to assist those at the highest 
level in organizations (International Organisation for Standardization 2008). The standard 
assists top management to understand and fulfil their legal, regulatory, and ethical obligations 
in respect of organizations' use of IT. The COSO framework, developed by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) provides guidance to 
organizations on critical aspects of organizational governance, business ethics, internal 
control, enterprise risk management, fraud, and financial reporting (COSO 2009). 
Managing IT resources of COS requires appropriate governance structures. Strategic 
alliances like COS are not new. Rather, they are an attempt to pool resources with the intent 
that elements of co-creation, co-development, and co-innovation will generate superior value 
compared to independent efforts of organizations. The same analogy applies to establishment 
of IT governance structures for COS. Alliance partners must bring their unique IT 
governance competencies to COS. Thus, IT governance structures for COS would be 
products of synergy between IT-related competencies of the alliance partners. Our theoretical 
framework discussed in section III suggests some possible IT governance structures for COS.    
Inter-organizational collaboration on IT-backed infrastructures like COS enables 
organizations to survive in today’s globalized world of doing business. Understandably, 
practices required to manage inter-organizational structures differ from those of single 
                                                          
1 For further descriptions of COBIT, refer to Tuttle, B., and Vandervelde, S.D. An empirical examination of 
CobiT as an internal control framework for information technology. International Journal of Accounting 
Information Systems, 8, 4 (2007) 240-263. 
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enterprises. This situation is also relevant to IT resources of alliance structures. A critical 
characteristic of COS is that two or more independent organizations are working towards a 
common goal, which they feel is harder to achieve on their own (Dyer and Singh 1998; 
Grover and Kohli 2012). Many of today’s value chains associated with products and services 
extend beyond organizations (Rai et al. 2012; Iyer, Aubeterre, and Singh 2008). The 
competitive forces of today’s turbulent business environment compel organizations to 
consider activities of value chains that fall beyond their organizations (Hong 2002). The 
fundamental tool that allows organizations to extend management of the value chain is their 
information systems. Today’s modern IT tools facilitate IS integration, and they present 
organizations with an IT infrastructure platform for co-management of value chains through 
co-creation, co-development, and co-innovation. This environment increases the level of 
inter-organizational dependencies between the partners (Zarvić et al. 2012). As such, 
structures and mechanisms to manage these collaborative settings would involve elements of 
synergy between involved partners (Dyer 1997; Kumar and van Diesel 1996). 
Organizations have collaborated for many years. Oliver (1990) discusses early forms 
of inter-organizational collaborative  relationships that include trade associations, voluntary 
agency federations, joint ventures, joint programs, cooperative financial interlocks, and 
agency sponsor linkages. A decade later, Barringer and Harrison (2000) discuss newer forms 
of inter-organizational collaborative relationships such as networks, consortia, alliances, trade 
associations, and interlock directorates. Recent inter-organizational collaborative 
relationships take the form of virtual organizations (Markus and Agres 2000; Camarinha-
Matos et al. 2009), and virtual corporations (Staples, Hulland, and Higgins 1999). Many prior 
inter-organizational collaborative structures are still present today. However, a subtle 
difference in today’s inter-organizational collaboration is that the IT resources are playing a 
critical role in managing these collaborative structures. The result of this level of IT 
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participation in collaborative structures has created digital business ecosystems (Camarinha-
Matos and Afsarmanesh 2005; Ceccagnoli et al. 2012). 
These IT-intensive collaborations have broadened the business goals of IT. IT 
investments are no longer about costs; it is about growth and innovation. Thus, while IT 
continues to support business processes, its core role has shifted to proactively influencing 
business strategy. This shifting focus of the role of IT has seen the need for collaboration 
change from a tool to perform standard processes at less cost to that of a source for 
innovation. However, old habits will have to die to leverage the unique capabilities of today’s 
technologies. Appropriate governance structures should ensure that innovation is nurtured 
rather than stifled. IT governance structures will need to accommodate broader relationships 
between IT and collaboration partners. The only possible way to achieve this outcome is for 
collaborative partners to merge their unique IT-related competencies and share a common 
understanding of the business value of collaborative relationships. This situation requires a 
deeper understanding of IT governance structures for COS. We present our theoretical 
framework next to obtain directions for sourcing this deeper understanding on IT governance 
structures for COS. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Need for Governance of Organizational Resources   
Governance of organizational assets, including IT assets, could be justified using the lens of 
agency relationships (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Management need to 
adopt governance mechanisms of organizational assets to manage contracting costs. For 
COS, this contracting cost relates to the cost of governing their relational IT infrastructure. 
Alternatively, system-oriented theories of legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory (Deegan 
2002) also justify need for good governance of organizational assets. While the managerial 
and behavioural theories (Williamson 1975), and systems-oriented theories, justify the need 
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for corporate governance, they do not present mechanisms to govern these organizational 
assets. 
Effective management of organizational resources is an important organizational 
capability (Barney 1991). Organizational [IT] capabilities are unique organization-specific 
competencies that provide and sustain competitive advantage (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, and 
Konsynski 2000; Santhanam and Hartono 2003). That is, an organization’s ability to sustain 
its IT-related capabilities will be contingent upon its capability to govern its IT resources. 
This situation implies that organizations’ IT governance structures would have to be unique – 
a capability, to achieve and maintain IT-related competitive advantages.  
A Resources-Centric Approach to IT Governance for COS   
The resource centric approach (Barney 1991) advocates that an organization constitutes a 
bundle of resources. This approach suggests the dynamics of resources in organizations to 
achieve and sustain a competitive position. Capabilities that will contribute to IT governance 
structures of COS will originate from participating organizations. This situation means that 
organizations must understand and develop their unique IT governance competencies to 
leverage IT resources uniquely. The increasing attention and dependence on IT to achieve 
strategic objectives compels organizations to have continuous investment in modern IT 
resources. This nature of investment in IT resources would require dynamic capabilities for 
governing IT resources.  
A dynamic capability (Teece 2007) is an organization’s ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments. The 
dynamic capabilities framework (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997) suggests mechanisms by 
which organizations could nourish their capabilities to enjoy and improve on their achieved 
competitive advantages. Organizations would nourish their IT governance competencies  by 
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organizing various capabilities internally with varied magnitude and variability (Teece 2007).  
This exercise will ensure that an organization participates in a COS with optimal IT 
governance competencies. However, governance of IT resources within COS would require 
dynamic governance capabilities and competencies across the network of alliances of the 
COS. The relational view of the firm  (Dyer and Singh 1998; Borgatti and Cross 2003) offers 
a useful framework to suggest IT governance structures for COS. 
The Relational View of IT Governance for COS   
The relational view of the firm posits that organizations critical resources may extend beyond 
organizational boundaries (Dyer and Singh 1998). This situation means that for structures 
like COS, business value is possible when alliances are willing to make alliance-specific 
investments and combine resources in better ways (Dyer 1996). That is, idiosyncratic 
linkages of dynamic capabilities are the source of sustainable competitive advantage for 
COS. This characteristic implies that organizations that are part of COS would need to link 
their unique IT governance capabilities to develop IT governance structures to manage 
collaborative IT. When applied to COS, the relational view of the firm focuses on the concept 
of collaborative rent. Collaborative rent is possible through specialization of assets (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993).  
A fundamental requisite for effective COS is alliance-based knowledge sharing. 
Organizations often learn by collaborating with others (Levinson and Asahi 1995). This 
situation has been proved in various industries (von Hippel 1988; Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr 1996). These outcomes suggest that collaboration within the partners in COS is the key 
source of new ideas and innovation. New sources of ideas will direct organizations to develop 
and invest in performance-enhancing technology and infrastructures. The overarching 
mechanism that will ensure creation of inter-firm assets and inter-firm knowledge sharing are 
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the IT governance structures. IT governance plays a critical role in creation of business value 
from collaborative IT resources. This outcome is possible because IT governance would 
influence the willingness of collaborative alliance partners to engage in value creation 
initiatives. A specialised asset, an alliance-based asset in COS, would have a lower 
alternative value (Dyer and Singh 1998). This situation means that COS need IT governance 
structures to permit alliance-related assets to reduce transaction costs and enhance efficiency 
of alliance partners. That is, IT governance structures of COS should have the ability to 
minimise risks of investment in specialized IT resources and deliver anticipated value to the 
alliance. (Ray, Wu, and Konana 2009; Pisano 1991). This situation means collaboration 
within alliance partners through appropriate IT governance structures would improve the 
efficiency of their respective operations.      
IT Governance structures in COS should be third-party enforced through contracts or 
self-enforcing agreements (Dyer and Singh 1998). The need for governance under 
behavioural, managerial, and systems-oriented theories may imply the need for third-party 
enforced IT governance structures (Williamson 1981). However, with alliances like COS, 
informal social contracts are better forms of IT governance structures (Hill et al. 2009). Many 
IT governance structures within informal social contracts rely on personal trust relationships, 
reputation, and goodwill (Dyer and Chu 2003; Uzzi 1997). IT governance structures with 
these values are likely to be less costly and promote elements of self-enforcement and 
monitoring (Dyer and Singh 1998). Alliances, however, could develop hard matrices to 
evaluate their performance. Provan and Kenis (2008) also share similar thoughts, and suggest 
that networks could be participant-governed, lead-organization governed, or administratively 
governed. Shared participant governance (Provan and Kenis 2008) is a way to govern 
collaborative structures where there is a small number of participants and goal consensus 
amongst these participants is high. In shared governance, partners collectively make 
- 13 - 
decisions and manage the network activities (Provan and Kenis 2008; Venkatraman and Chi-
Hyon 2004). Power in this network regarding decisions is symmetrical (Provan and Kenis 
2008), which calls for equitable contribution of resource utilization capabilities. These 
arguments suggest that governance of collaborative IT requires sharing and identifying 
synergies between organizations IT-related competencies. In the following section, we adopt 
the above theoretical underpinning and develop the study’s research hypotheses. We do this 
by suggesting IT governance structures and relate these structures to the collaborative rent of 
the COS.    
IV. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Lateral Relational IT Steering Committee (RSC)  
A lateral relational IT steering committee (RSC) is an IT governance structure of top and 
middle managers of alliance partners to direct strategic role of collaborative IT of COS. The 
term lateral relates to participating with agility and creativity in a structure. Relational relates 
to an element of synergy or relationship in a structure. The IT steering committee as an IT 
governance structure has played an important role in the governance of IT resources within 
organizations (Doll and Torkzadeh 1987; Karimi et al. 2000; Prasad, Heales, and Green 2010; 
Torkzadeh and Xia 1992). The synergy between these within-organization capabilities, the 
RSC of a COS, would ensure synergy between the decision-making capabilities of top and 
middle management of alliance partners. That is, RSC will ensure alignment of tactical and 
strategic considerations on collaborative IT for COS. This alignment would ensure that 
collaborative IT contributes to strategic objectives of COS.  
The nature of RSC will reduce or avoid contracting costs. This situation is possible 
because this structure will ensure that collaborative partners will trust that value will be 
divided fairly (Dyer and Singh 1998). RSC will minimize opportunism (Sarkees 2011) 
because this structure is rooted in the concept of equity, and there would be little anticipation 
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of cheating. These features of RSC will ensure that alliance partners have common strategic 
vision on their participation and subsequent investment in collaborative IT in COS. This 
communality in strategic vision will ensure the subsequent IT-related decisions align to the 
strategic objective of COS. These decisions would contribute to the collaborative capacity of 
COS. The decisions of a RSC would be self-enforcing agreements that would reduce the cost 
of complex adaptations (Dyer 1997). Self-enforced agreements result in quick realization 
synergies between collaboration-specific assets, and swift decision making to leverage 
unexpected opportunities. RSC will also encourage greater value-creating initiatives because 
value-creating attributes like sharing of tacit knowledge, offering innovations, and 
responsiveness emerge in informal governance arrangements. The laterality, relations, equity, 
and trust embedded in RSC has the potential to motivate alliance partners to participate and 
strengthen the IT-related capacities and capabilities of COS with reduced chances of 
unfavorable opportunism. The resultant environment would contribute significantly to 
collaborative rent of COS. Aside, the suggested unique elements of RSC imply that other 
COS structures would not easily be able to replicate this environment. That is, RSC for a 
COS would be unique and imitable. The element of inimitably is important in ensuring 
continued strategic advantage from collaborative IT compared to other COS settings. 
Consistent with these arguments we suggest: 
H1:  The IT governance structure of lateral relational IT steering committee 
will positively contribute to the collaborative rent of a collaborative 
organizational structure.       
Relational IT Operational Systems Committee (ROC)     
The RSC would ensure that collaborative IT decisions align with the strategic objectives of 
establishing COS. However, achieving set objectives requires appropriate execution of 
resources at the business process level. Execution of collaborative IT requires coordination at 
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the operational level. We propose an IT governance structure of relational IT operations 
systems committee (ROC) as being important in the execution of collaborative IT resources.  
 ROC is an IT governance structure of operational level managers of alliance partners 
that ensure appropriate fit of collaborative IT to value chains of COS. This fit is an important 
determinant of strategic contributions of collaborative IT to COS. ROC requires cohesion 
between operational managers of COS alliance partners. Alliance partners will manage their 
information systems and develop new applications using their COS IT infrastructure to co-
innovate and manage their value chain. Activities at the value chain level of a COS are the 
key determinants of collaborative rent of COS and business value of alliance partners of that 
COS. Managing value chains within COS is a shared responsibility of alliance partners. The 
resultant operational level responsibility will require some level of control and ownership 
(Sambamurthy and Zmud 2000). That is, effective fit of IT resources in value chains within a 
COS requires an element of bottom-up approach to IT governance (Rosenkopf, Metiu, and 
George 2001). Essentially, alliances in COS will require governance of technical aspects of 
IT to facilitate technical innovation (Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995). Technical innovation 
is possible with control and independence of the operational staff. This capacity will 
encourage a deeper thinking on the mechanics of the business processes on the IT platform of 
COS with the aim of achieving better collaborative rent. Evidently, alliance partners may 
perceive that operational-level collaboration may result in loss of propriety information 
through interactions that may occur in COS. A governance structure like ROC, however, 
would embed the perception that potential benefits would outweigh any risks and costs 
(Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George 2001). This structure reinforces the concept of superior value 
in collaborative setting compared to a within-organization setting. ROC will ensure access 
and control of technical knowledge of alliance partners of COS. This resource will provide 
opportunities to alliance partners in COS to increase visibility and legitimize their position in 
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the alliance. The result would be equitable sharing of tacit knowledge, which when codified, 
could form standards to improve and innovate existing business processes.  
Innovative business processes of COS value chains will assist the COS alliance 
partners in bringing new products and higher level of service to the market more quickly. 
This outcome would contribute to collaborative rent of COS. Equitable sharing of tacit 
knowledge will also manage any perceived alliance status conflicts, and will strengthen the 
collaborative base. Ultimately, the result of an IT governance structure like ROC would be a 
stronger synergy between the collaborative rent associated with investing in collaborative IT 
resources and the collaborative rent associated with effective use of IT resources. The result 
of this synergy would be technical innovation that will ensure better and sustainable 
collaborative rent, and eventual attainment of strategic goals of COS. Consistent with these 
arguments we suggest: 
H2: The IT governance structure of relational IT operational systems 
committee will positively contribute to the collaborative rent of a 
collaborative organizational structure.       
Relational IT Performance Management System (RPM) 
RSC and ROC IT governance structures would ensure strategic alignment of collaborative IT 
decisions and subsequent execution of collaborative IT at business process level. A 
complementary IT governance structure in the form of a formal performance management 
system is important in achieving the set objectives and ensuring sustainability of COS. Many 
collaborative alliances have failed in the past (Cravens, Piercy, and Cravens 2000). This 
outcome implies the need for more efforts on assessing performance of relationships in COS. 
COS would like to be sustainable because investment in collaborative IT carry substantial 
opportunity costs. Moreover, sustained strategic value from COS is contingent upon its 
maturity and longevity. A number of formal mechanics would ensure this maturity and 
longevity. Thus, governance of collaborative IT of COS requires implementation of formal 
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performance measures and reliable indicators of alliances’ success. Alliance partners must 
have clear consensus regarding requirements for a successful alliance, and agreement on 
appropriate measures to assess performance. These requirements should complement the 
implied measures of COS performance such as trust, commitment, and other intangibles. We 
suggest the presence of a relational IT performance management system (RPM) as an 
important IT governance structure for COS. RPM is an IT governance structure of evaluating 
the effectiveness of collaborative IT with broader collaborative-based performance matrices 
to ensure strategic intents of investing in collaborative IT are fulfilled.          
Performance management systems assist in aligning objectives of COS with future 
alliance agreements or reward structures. This alignment will ensure longevity of 
collaborative arrangements. Misaligned performances could result in suboptimal use of 
collaborative IT by alliance partners. Such actions would affect the entire alliance, despite 
full commitment by some. Presence of some form of opportunity cost for suboptimal 
performance is necessary for effective use of IT resources within alliances. RPM can achieve 
effective coordination and alignment within an alliance (Ziggers and Tjemkes 2010). 
Performance management tools like formal planning, coordination and monitoring of the 
alliance can achieve this outcome (Burney and Matherly 2007). This effort will ensure that 
alliances’ efforts in IT deployment and use are continuous and maintain the fit of alliance 
partners to COS. Partners require specific objectives that blend into overall objectives of 
COS. This setting will ensure that the alliance puts equitable effort in maintaining a balance 
between cooperation and competition (Douma et al. 2000). RPM will help ensure that 
collaborative IT resources’ value to the COS is consistent. This outcome is possible because 
performance management will ensure that alliance partners continually leverage the IT 
resources. Continual leveraging of IT resources through an IT performance management 
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system will ensure sustainable collaborative rent. Consistent with these arguments we 
suggest: 
H3: The IT governance structure of relational IT performance management 
system will positively contribute to the collaborative rent of a collaborative 
organizational structure.       
Business Value of Alliance Partners from Collaborative Rent  
There is a trajectory in achieving business value from IT resources in various organizational 
settings (Dehning and Richardson 2002; Masli et al. 2011; Callahan, Gabriel, and Smith 
2009; Krishnan and Sriram 2000; Mahmood and Mann 1993). A critical thought on this 
trajectory is that initial assessment of  business value should be at the consumption point of 
IT resources (Zhu 2004; Davamanirajan et al. 2006). However, ultimately organizations are 
responsible to their own stakeholders. These stakeholders would require a mapping of their 
sacrifice of resources to an organization against the value derived from the organization. 
Organizations form alliances like COS to identify opportunities and create value for their 
stakeholders (Weber and Chathoth 2008). A prerequisite for this position is building the 
capacity, the collaborative rent. The collaborative rent forms the basis for innovation within 
alliance partners. Innovation as an outcome of a collaborative alliance like COS would be 
creation of better or more effective products and services and better mechanisms of delivery 
of products and services for the key stakeholders. These outcomes would contribute to value 
of organizations in delivering superior products, managing threats to entrants, managing and 
understanding key stakeholders, and maintaining a competitive edge within their industry 
(Porter and May 2001; Turban and Volonino 2011). 
The collaborate capacity of IT resources is a powerful tool to improving business 
value (Smith and McKeen 2008; Smith and McKeen 2011). Organizations invest in alliance-
specific IT resources to improve the assets’ collaborative capacity. For example, 
organizations invest in bigger beyond-organization Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
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systems to obtain unified views of various resources within structures like COS. In fact, 
results are collaborative rents in the form a dynamic and collaborative IT infrastructures on 
which to develop new models of business. A dynamic IT infrastructure is scalable, 
compatible, modular, and can handle multiple business applications and business models 
(Bhatt et al. 2010; Byrd and Turner 2001). The dynamic IT infrastructure of COS will permit 
alliance partners to improve firm specific value through collaboration in managing processes. 
That is, partners could segregate and realize specific values from collaborative rent of COS 
relative to organizations that do not engage in alliance or engage in non-COS alliances. If 
fact, organizations would not form IT-based alliances like COS, if perceived business value 
of COS was not more than value sourced through investment of the same financial resources 
in acquiring firm-specific IT resources.  
Aside, the dynamic IT infrastructure of COS is a much wider platform to refine 
existing and develop new information systems. The capacities of these new information 
systems will represent a better fit of IT tools to existing processes. The result of this fit would 
be intelligent ways to create business value in alliance organizations. This situation means 
that collaborative rent of COS is an important source of business value for alliance partners 
of that COS. Consistent with these arguments we suggest: 
H4: The collaborative rent of the collaborative organizational structure, which 
an alliance partner belongs to, will positively contribute to the business 
value of the respective alliance partners.       
Consistent with the above arguments, we suggest the following research model for a 
relational view of IT governance structure for COS. We controlled for firm size (number of 
employees, and firm maturity (number of years of existence).  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
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V. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A Survey Research Approach 
We employed a field survey to collect data to test the proposed model. This field survey 
allows data collection from a broad area, and it is the best way to reach geographically 
dispersed contacts. This approach was especially important in this study as COS are 
established to manage processes with partners over disperse geographic locations.  
Instrument Development and Test 
Extant literature discusses various IT governance structures and their evaluation measures. 
However, fully validated measurement items of this study’s IT governance structures and 
related measures do not exist.   This situation meant the current study required development 
of new measures for the model’s constructs. We adopted the approach suggested by Davies 
(1989) and Moore and Benbasat (1991) to develop and validate measurement items of this 
study’s constructs. The validation steps included item generation, item sorting and 
refinement, and a pilot test.  
We developed a pool of measures of model constructs by referring to a prior 
interpretive study, further informal discussions with organizations that are part of COS, and 
by reviewing related extant literature. Twelve fellow faculty colleagues with interest and 
expertise relating to this research participated in the initial measurement item sorting and 
refinement processes. This process led to elimination and refinement of some items. The 
sorting inter-rater scores, the Cohen’s Kappa (κ), of the refined pool of measures indicated 
that inter-rater reliability for the participants was within the full agreement range (κ = 0.60 – 
0.80) or within almost perfect agreement (κ = 0.81 – 1.00).  The outcome of this sorting and 
subsequent refinement process was a set of near-final measurement items for each construct. 
Thirty graduate students from an MIS MBA course representing organizations that engage in 
some form of IT-based collaboration participated in the pilot test. The outcome of this 
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exercise was a pilot dataset and suggestions of possible ambiguities with presentation of 
measurement items. Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) of the pilot test data using a 
component-based package indicated that data exhibited normal measurement qualities. Due 
to limited data set of pilot study (30), we conducted EFA for IT governance and value 
measures separately. The above item validation measures gave us reasonable assurance that 
measurement items would measure what they were purported to measure. Table 1 presents 
the final measurement items for the constructs in the proposed research model.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Sampling Frame and Survey Administration  
We obtained contact details of organizations that could engage in collaborative alliances from 
the ORBIS database. ORBIS is a publication of Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing 
(BvDEP). ORBIS provides information on listed and unlisted companies across the globe. 
For survey administration reasons, we limited our sampling frame to a single country - 
Australia.  For the purposes of our study, data on collaborative structures across organisations 
collected in a single country – Australia – was deemed representative of such structures in 
other developed economies. The demographics of businesses, stakeholders, business 
executives, and nature of business collaboration in this country relate well to other developed 
markets. This database does not explicate details of organizations collaborative efforts but 
provides shareholder/subsidiary links. Our sample selection had to be non-random and 
purposeful to ensure our sampling frame contained only those organizations that engaged in 
some form of IT-backed collaboration. That is, we tried to eliminate possible responses from 
contacts informing their non-participation in IT-backed alliances. To achieve this, we 
browsed organizations corporate reports and other releases, their Websites, and contacted 
them by phone and email to determine the extent of their IT-based collaboration efforts. We 
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looked for cues of discussion on partnership initiatives, IT investment announcements, and 
creation of, or expansion of, e-commerce-based revenue models as indications of IT-based 
collaboration. At the end of this exercise, nine hundred and seventy-six target respondents 
(companies) from this database constituted the sampling frame for this study.  
We adopted Dillman’s (2007) methodology to develop and administer the online 
research instrument. A complementary paper-based survey was not possible due to the 
geographical spread of contacts. We approached the contacts with an initial instrument 
package delivery via email and two email reminders. The email contained the link to the 
survey. At the conclusion of the instrument administration process, we received 192 valid 
responses, a response rate of 19.67 percent. The contacts that responded represented firms 
from major industries (Banking, Finance, Hospitality, Tourism, Travel, Media, 
Entertainment, Publishing, Retail, Wholesale, Distribution, Telecommunications, 
Transportation, and Logistics). The respondents included the Director of Management 
Information Systems, and Chief Information Officers, with relevant industry experience. 
Table 2 presents further details of the demographics of the contacts that responded favorably 
to the survey. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Data Diagnostics Checks 
We tested for non-response bias with first and last thirty responses for all measures, including 
the demographic variables. Contacts that responded after first and second reminders acted as 
proxies for non-respondents. We did not find any significant differences on any of the 
variables. Examination of common methods variance using Harman’s single-factor test, 
where all items were subject to exploratory factor analysis (EFA), revealed common methods 
variance was not an issue. More than one factor emerged from un-rotated factor solutions, 
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and more than one factor explained majority of the variance. There were no issues of missing 
data. 
VI. RESULTS 
A Components-Based Approach to Model Testing 
We used partial least squares (PLS), a components-based structural equation modeling (SEM) 
program to test theoretical relationships amongst latent variables (structural path) and 
relationships between latent variables and their indicators (measurement paths). PLS is 
suitable for application and prediction (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted 2003). PLS assumes 
that all measured variance is useful variance, and it estimates latent variables as exact linear 
combinations of observed measures, avoiding indeterminacy problems and providing an 
exact definition of component scores (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted 2003).  
Assessment of the Measurement Model   
The purpose of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was to confirm that measurement items 
measured what they were purported to measure. The outcome of this exercise provides 
credibility to the outcome of assessment of model relationships. CFA showed factor loadings 
for constructs load highly only on their designated constructs. Measurement items have a 
factor loading mostly above the rule of thumb of a loading of 0.70,  indicating  at least 50% 
of the variance in a manifest variable is accounted for by the construct (Hair et al. 2008). 
Cross-loadings analysis revealed manifest variables load highly only on desired latent 
variables.  Table 3 presents factor loading and cross loadings. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 4 presents the results of the measurement model assessment, including Cronbach’s 
alpha, average variance extracted, composite readability, and inter-construct correlations. The 
alpha coefficients of all constructs was higher than 0.70 (Nunnally 1978). The more accurate 
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composite reliabilities, which avoid the assumption of equal weightings, were above 0.80. 
The average variance extracted were all above the acceptable 0.50 level (Chin 1988). The 
square root of average variance extracted, which represents the average association of each 
construct to its measures, was higher than correlations with other constructs. This statistic 
indicates that constructs closely relates to their own measures rather than to those of other 
constructs. Table 4 shows the square root of average variance extracted diagonally in bold.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Assessment of the Structural Model  
The three IT governance structures (RSC, ROC, RPM) significantly and favorably relate to 
collaborative rent of COS. ROC (0.529 (8.6222***)) shares the most significant relationship 
with collaborative rent of COS, followed by RSC (0.233 (3.654***)), and RPM (0.154 
(2.950***)). Overall, the three IT governance structures explain 52 percent of variance in 
collaborative rent of COS. These outcomes support H1-H3. The collaborative rent of COS 
also influences favorably and significantly business value of alliance partners of that COS 
(0.640 (8.942***)). The collaborative rent of COS shares 41.7 percent variance in business 
value of alliance partners of that COS. This outcome supports H4. These results mean that 
one can infer that the suggested IT governance structures for COS contribute to business 
value of alliance partners of that COS. The relationship of control variables was insignificant. 
Figure 3 details outcomes of assessment of the structural model.        
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
VII  DISCUSSION 
Today’s modern IT resources present organizations with opportunities to engage in various 
forms of collaborative alliances. The backbone of these alliances is a strong across-
organization IT infrastructure. This infrastructure is essentially a product of significant 
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integration of alliance partners’ process-related information systems. This outcome provides 
organizations with greater control of product and service value chains, and avenues to co-
innovate, co-develop, and co-create to enhance value chains. These activities are essential to 
remaining competitive in today’s turbulent business environment. Alliance partners would 
continue to invest in collaborative IT resources as long as they perceive that the collaborative 
platform provides them opportunities to obtain superior value. That is, alliance partners 
would perceive collaborative rent as a better trajectory to obtaining value than through 
specific within-organization initiatives. Alliance partners would leverage collaborative rent to 
obtain firm-specific business value to solidify their competitive position.  
As collaborative IT is also bound by the strategic necessity hypothesis (Powell and 
Dent-Micallef 1997), appropriate leverage of collaborative IT will provide differentiating 
values to alliance partners through COS. Alliances IT governance efforts will contribute to 
achieving this differentiating value from their collaborative IT. The central notion within our 
relational framework is that COS IT governance competencies will not originate in an 
alliance. Rather, IT governance competencies of COS would be outcomes of synergies or 
relations of competencies of COS partners. We suggest identification of these synergies in 
competencies throughout the COS. This stance is important because value from collaborative 
IT in COS will require coordination on adoption issues, value chain fit issues, and 
performance management issues. That is, COS will require a holistic approach to governing 
collaborative IT. Thus, we propose a relational IT steering committee, a relational IT 
operational committee, and a relational IT performance management system as IT 
governance structures for COS. The RSC would ensure alignment of investment in 
collaborative IT with strategic objectives of alliance partners. The relational nature of this 
structure would identify commonalities in the strategic thoughts on collaborative IT. This 
outcome would ensure collective investment in collaboration-specific IT resources. ROC 
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would ensure operationalization of strategic intents of setting COS and investing in 
collaborative IT. Operational personnel are custodians of much of tacit IT-related know-how. 
Relating this know-how would present powerful tools to COS to invigorate value chains of 
products and services. An IT governance structure like ROC at the operational level will also 
ensure cross-functional IT-business alignment within COS. This alignment is essential in 
ensuring visibility in integrating various process-related information systems for better 
business value to alliance partners. RPM is critical to formally bound strategic intents in 
engaging in COS and investing in collaborative IT. A number of factors and opportunities 
may provide rationalization for alliance partners to engage in non-collaborative behaviour. 
That is, implied COS bonding attributes of trust, and goodwill wound not eradiate potential 
self-interest motives of alliance partners. RPM as a congruent collaborative IT related 
performance management system would ensure that decisions relating to acquisition and use 
of IT resources show more benefits to COS.  
The primary purpose of establishing IT governance structures in a setting like COS 
are to ensure collaborative IT contributes to strategic goals of alliance partners. This situation 
means that the effectiveness of these IT governance structures requires continuous evaluation. 
We suggested collaborative rent is the initial value assessment point of initiatives of COS. H1 
to H3 suggested, and data confirmed that IT governance structures of RSC, ROC, and RPM 
positively influence collaborative rent of COS. This outcome implies that suggested IT 
governance structures for COS are appropriate, and decisions stemming from these structures 
contribute to initial measures of strategic intents of COS. That is, the IT governance 
structures of COS set the platform for organizations to enjoy superior benefits from their 
invested IT resources. This outcome is important for COS because alliance partners’ ability to 
maintain their competitive position will be contingent upon their ability to make innovative 
use of collaborative IT resources to refine their across-organization business processes.  
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COS is a setting for maximum utilization of scarce organizational resources. COS 
does not preclude organizations from meeting expectations of their stakeholders. This means 
that alliance partners would eventually anticipate discriminant firm-level business value from 
their COS. Thus, investment in collaborative IT and subsequent IT governance efforts should 
relate to business value of alliance partners. However, this value will first aggregate in the 
form of collaborative rent of COS. H4 suggested, and data confirmed that collaborative rent 
of COS positively influences business value of alliance partners. This outcome implies that 
collaborative efforts of alliance partners provide them with the capacity to provide superior 
value to their stakeholders. This outcome also implies that collaborative management of 
product and service value chains provides significant benefits to custodians of value chains.  
The controlled factors of organization size and maturity did not significantly relate to 
collaborative rent and business value of alliance partners. A plausible reason for this nature of 
relationship is that the influence of these factors may be absorbed in the extent of the 
suggested IT governance structures. That is, the capacity of suggested IT governance 
structures for COS is influenced by the size and maturity of the alliance partners of that COS. 
In summary, the data fits and supports the research model well. This outcome has allowed us 
to infer that the suggested IT governance structures are relevant for COS as they contribute 
directly to the collaborative rent of COS, and indirectly, to the business value of alliance 
partners of COS. With this finding established, in the next section, we discuss how this study 
contributes to theory and practice, how it provides directions for future research, and we state 
limitations of this study.                                                                
VIII RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION, DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH, 
LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to the IT governance literature in a number of ways. First, we suggest 
the relational perspective as appropriate to suggesting IT governance structures for 
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management of IT resources in collaborative settings. Continuing business stress, and 
availability of modern IT infrastructures like cloud computing mean organizations will 
continue to consider external value-generating initiatives. Engaging in IT-backed 
collaborative initiatives with key strategic partners is an external value-generating initiative. 
Future research could consider the importance of suggested IT governance structures in 
various IT-backed collaborative settings.  Future research can also consider the suggested 
framework to suggest other possible IT governance structures for COS. Second, this study 
makes an important contribution in suggesting a trajectory of value assessment in COS for 
the alliance partners. Many past IT-related initiatives failed because organizations were 
unable to demonstrate its value to their key stakeholders (Barua and Mukhopadhyay 2000). 
We suggest that collaborative rent be the initial value assessment point for COS.  Alliance 
partners can then relate this collaborative rent to their own benefits from participating in 
COS. Future research can consider the concept of collaborative rent in specific COS settings. 
This effort would be important in today’s dynamic and ever changing IT ecosystems.             
This study also has implications for practice. First, this study suggests the importance 
of inter-organizational coordination in governing IT resources within COS. This suggestion 
implies that organizations should evaluate their current IT-related competencies and consider 
ways to share these competencies in their collaborative engagement. Competitive pressures 
will compel organizations to engage in various across-organization value generating efforts. 
IT resources will play a critical role in these efforts. Perhaps, organizations learning on 
effective use of IT resources needs to be continuous to ensure their active participation in 
these efforts. Second, the suggestion of collaborative rent as the key motive for engaging in 
COS is important. This implies that organizations would need to understand that firm-specific 
value from COS is possible, but only through coordinated collaborative efforts. Hence, 
organizations should engage in COS with a firm motivation for ensuring the collaborative 
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capacity, and belief of sourcing individual firm-specific value from this collaborative 
capacity.                
This study has a number of limitations. First a response rate of nearly 20 percent is 
pleasing but in the mid-range of acceptable response rate. We, however, did solicit responses 
from 192 contacts, and detailed diagnostics of the data did not reveal any issues on data 
quality and population representation. The data was also adequate to assess the structural 
properties of the suggested research model according to suggested benchmarks (Chin 1988). 
Second, this study uses a cross-sectional research design, which allows for assessment of 
important relationships between IT governance structures, the collaborative rent of the COS, 
and business value of the alliance partners. This approach does not address the question of 
causality. Despite the strong internal validity procedures in instrument development, testing, 
and administration, the sustainability of this study’s findings is limited. A longitudinal study 
strengthens the causality and sustainability aspects of a research. Third, we suggest three IT 
governance structures for COS. A number of other factors can conceivably influence the 
effectiveness of these IT governance structures. We controlled for alliance partner size and 
maturity, which showed insignificant association with collaborative rent and business value 
of alliance partners.  While the effects of other variables like age of COS, nature of operation, 
IT intensity of COS, and technical skills of alliance partners may also be captured in the 
extent of the governance structures of COS, their exclusion may present some bias in the 
results. Fourth, we obtained perceptions on both the collaborative rent and the business value 
of alliance partners from one contact from an alliance partner. That is, a contact provided 
perceived value of both collaborative rent of COS and its own business value from the COS 
setting. This situation may present some bias in these measures. This situation could be 
addressed using actual relational data, which has two independent datasets. However, in this 
study, COS is not a separate entity. In addition, with the suggestion of shared governance in 
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COS, the alliances partners would have the most understanding on the operation of their 
COS. Finally, while this study makes every conceivable effort in validating the research 
instrument, potential demand bias may exist in responding to measurement items. However, 
this is a residual bias in every survey research approach.        
To conclude, organizations engagement in COS will intensify in future. The role of IT 
resources will be significant within these inter-firm structures. Sustainable competitive 
advantage from these structures will be contingent upon effective utilization of the integrated 
and pooled IT resources. Understanding on IT governance structures for COS is critical to 
ensuring the strategic intent of participating in these inter-firm settings. This study has 
contributed to this understanding. But, much effort will be required in future to provide IT-
utilization skill set to a dynamic and ever changing IT ecosystem.         
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
A Relational Model of IT Governance Structure for COS 
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Table 1 
Final Measurement Items for Model Constructs 
 
All items measured on a 7 point Likert scale (No basis for answering [0], Strongly Disagree [1], Disagree [2], 
Slightly Disagree [3], Neutral [4], Slightly Agree [5], Agree [6], Strongly Agree [7]).  
Lateral Relational IT Steering Committee  
Our top management and tactical managers are part of an inter-organizational IT steering committee that 
makes IT-related resource allocation decisions within our collaborative alliance. 
Our top management and tactical managers are part of an inter-organizational IT steering committee that 
improves visibility of IT and revamps the IT practices within our collaborative alliance. 
Our top management and tactical managers are part of an inter-organizational IT steering committee that helps 
facilitate the IT coordinating requirements and practices within our collaborative alliance.  
Our top management and tactical managers are part of an inter-organizational IT steering committee that 
develop formal, long-term strategic plan for IT for our collaborative alliance. 
Our top management and tactical managers are part of an inter-organizational IT steering committee that 
regularly measures the overall effectiveness of the IT projects of our collaborative alliance. 
Relational  IT Operational Systems Committee 
Our operational managers are part of inter-organizational committee that makes decisions relating to 
alignment of business processes with the invested IT resources. 
Our operational managers are part of inter-organizational committee that discusses operational efficiencies of 
inter-organizational processes with the invested IT resources. 
Our operational managers are part of inter-organizational committee that set directions for process 
coordination between our collaborative alliances using the invested IT resources.  
Our operational managers are part of inter-organizational committee that makes decisions relating to 
refinement of existing business processes using the invested IT resources. 
Our operational managers are part of inter-organizational committee that makes decisions relating to linking 
of existing ad hoc processes using the invested IT resources.  
Relational IT Performance Management System 
Our organization uses broader metrics that consider factors outside our organization to evaluate our 
performance in relation to our collaborative alliance.  
Our organization uses metrics that consider factors outside our organization to evaluate operational alignment 
in relation to our collaborative alliance.  
Our organization uses metrics that consider factors outside our organization to evaluate operational 
consistency in relation to our collaborative alliance. 
Our Organization has developed matrices to evaluate its ability to maintain its alliance arrangement.  
Our organization has developed matrices to evaluate its collaborative interactions as being fair and equal.   
Collaborative Rent  
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved the agility of our IT infrastructure. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved the visibility of our business processes. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved our ability to generate new business 
models. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved our new product development efforts. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved our partner collaboration efforts. 
Business Value of Alliance Partners 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has decreased our operational costs. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has increased our market power.  
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved our financial position. 
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has improved our competitive position.  
Our IT-related investment in the collaborative alliance has reduced our business risks.  
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TABLE 2 
 Organization and Contact Demographics 
 
Industry Type No. of Responses 
Average Age of 
Organization* 
Average Size of 
Organizations** 
Average Age 
of Respondent 
(Years) 
Average Experience    
of Respondent in 
Current Position 
(Years) 
Banking 17 60 454 48 20 
Communication 10 35 320 33 6 
Distribution 17 41 65 28 6 
Manufacturing 22 65 86 41 12 
Retailing 36 26 32 36 8 
Transportation 16 65 135 32 13 
Tourism 13 16 67 45 5 
Travel 9 41 18 51 6 
Media 8 64 316 33 16 
Publishing  6 32 258 39 15 
Wholesaling  8 48 69 37 6 
Education 6 21 326 45 16 
Entertainment 11 63 156 46 21 
Others 13 32 96 31 13 
* Measured by number of years of existence. ** Measured by the number of employees. 
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TABLE 3 
Factor Loadings and Cross Loadings 
 
         BVA     COR     ROC     RPM     RSC 
BVA1 0.958 0.327 0.369 0.277 0.353 
BVA2 0.968 0.326 0.373 0.301 0.377 
BVA3 0.885 0.299 0.326 0.292 0.365 
BVA4 0.955 0.276 0.360 0.302 0.392 
BVA5 0.968 0.426 0.373 0.301 0.377 
COR1 0.488 0.807 0.438 0.289 0.336 
COR2 0.442 0.769 0.476 0.522 0.301 
COR3 0.440 0.797 0.314 0.492 0.390 
COR4 0.353 0.899 0.536 0.299 0.403 
COR5 0.353 0.899 0.536 0.299 0.403 
ROC1 0.191 0.316 0.756 0.248 0.172 
ROC2 0.352 0.363 0.786 0.305 0.241 
ROC3 0.305 0.375 0.824 0.384 0.278 
ROC4 0.362 0.315 0.795 0.376 0.330 
ROC5 0.316 0.308 0.860 0.427 0.281 
RPM1 0.326 0.404 0.387 0.918 0.258 
RPM2 0.211 0.399 0.414 0.711 0.204 
RPM3 0.231 0.358 0.327 0.878 0.303 
RPM4 0.328 0.414 0.399 0.924 0.254 
RPM5 0.233 0.359 0.326 0.877 0.302 
RSC1 0.357 0.458 0.314 0.335 0.887 
RSC2 0.266 0.327 0.272 0.208 0.787 
RSC3 0.324 0.331 0.249 0.187 0.796 
RSC4 0.371 0.367 0.282 0.281 0.840 
RSC5 0.300 0.310 0.208 0.219 0.827 
Note: BVA – Business Value of Alliance Partner, COR – Collaborative Rent of the COS, ROC – 
Relational IT Operational Systems Committee,  RPM – Relational IT Performance Management Systems, 
RSC  – Relational IT Steering Committee 
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TABLE 4 
 Measurement Properties of Data 
 
 
    AVE COR COA BVA COR ROC RPM RSC 
BVA 0.898 0.978 0.971 0.947   
COR 0.699 0.920 0.891 0.546 0.836   
ROC 0.648 0.902 0.864 0.380 0.567 0.805   
RPM 0.748 0.936 0.913 0.311 0.450 0.433 0.865   
RSC 0.686 0.916 0.886 0.393 0.441 0.324 0.305 0.830 
Note: BVA – Business Value of Alliance Partner, COR – Collaborative Rent of the COS, ROC – 
Relational IT Operational Systems Committee,  RPM – Relational IT Performance Management 
Systems, RSC  – Relational IT Steering Committee, AVE – Average Variance Extracted, COR – 
Composite Reliability, COA – Cronbach’s Alpha 
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